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THE BRAG DKAR PA FAMILY AND G.YANG THANG RDZONG: 
AN EXAMPLE OF INTERNAL ALLIANCES IN SIKKIM1 
Introduction 
SAUL MULLARD 
University of Oxford 
The formation of a political alliance results from a wide variety of 
contexts and circumstances, and may be driven, for example, by 
political necessity and common cultural, physical, emotional or 
economic bonds. So the term 'alnance' actually represents a rather 
complex and broad spectrum of social, political, economic or cultural 
issues, which when expressed in a similar way by people can act as a 
bond by which social groups are formed around some shared 
interest(s). Therefore, when analyzing the nature of internal relations 
and alliances in Sikkim one is drawn into a process which aims to 
understand the nature of these contexts. 
In other words, in order to understand alliances, we have to 
understand the contexts which have helped to shape and develop them. 
However, one constantly has to be aware that changes in these contexts 
necessitate a change or re-formulation of the nature of the alliance as 
by definition an alliance is not a permanent thing. Associations of this 
nature shift and adapt according to changes taking place within a wide 
variety of social contexts, such as far-reaching political, religious or 
economic transformations or a change in the focus of individuals or 
groups. For example, Bhutan and Sikkim formed a strong alliance in 
response to the mutual threat of Nepalese eastern expansion in the 
I780s and 90s. However, the preceding decades of the eighteenth 
century were characterized by Bhutanese and Sikkimese conflict. In a 
similar way, not only did the internal alliances of Sikkim in the 
I The author would like to express his gratitude to Mr. D. N. Tarkapa of 
Yangthang Dzong, without whose assistance this work would have been but a dream. 
He kindly showed me around the Dzong and allowed me to have access to the 
principle documents used here and to take a number of photos of weapons seized 
during the Bhutanese and Nepalese invasions of Sikkim. I would also like to thank Mr 
Wangdue of Pelling who took great interest in my work and for his knowledgeable 
and insightful discussions on this area of Sikkimese History, Charles Ramble for hi~ 
advice and guidance, Brigitte Steinmann who invited me to Paris to present this paper 
and to Miss Tsering Wangmo of Gangtok for all her help and assistance. 
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eighteenth century undergo a process of change relating to wider socio-
political changes in the region, but Tibetan and Sikkimese relations 
were also affected. The documents on which this presentation is based 
indicate the importance of these internal alliances as well as making 
passing reference to the wider alliances between Tibet and Sikkim. 
Two principal documents from the Brag dkar pa collection form the 
basis of this short assessment of internal Sikkimese alliances: document 
Y A4 dated by Dieter Schuh as 1785, although the date of this text 
should be 1784, and Document Y A8 dated 1796.2 These documents are 
set in the period of the Gorkha invasion of Sikkim and Nepal's eastern 
expansion. While they make passing reference to the events of this 
period, they are in essence land documents, which reinforce the internal 
alliance between the Brag dkar pa family and the Sikkimese state. 
Furthermore, they provide interesting although select information 
relating to the nature of Tibetan and Sikkimese relations. 
Since little work has been done on this area of Sikkimese history, 
this paper is really designed to contextualize this period and raise some 
important questions on the complexity of internal political alliances as 
well as wider associations and relations between Tibet and Sikkim. 
Since the primary source materials of this paper are land documents, 
other issues which represent alliances such as marital relations have not 
been addressed here. It may be interesting to note, however, that 
political marriage unions did exist between the Brag dkar pa family and 
other leading families in Sikkim and it is hoped that these alliances will 
be addressed specifically in a later paper. 
2 Schuh gives the date of 1785 for document Y A4 but this seems to have resulted 
from a misreading of shing 'brug for shing sbrul. These documents can be found in 
Schuh and Dagyab: 1978 Urkunden, Erlasse und Sendschriehen aus dem Besit:: 
sikkimesischer Adelshauser lllld des Kolsters Phodang: 17-34 and 43-50. Another 
important text will also be referred to here, document YA I, which was issued by the 
finance ministry of the bKa' shag of the Government of Lhasa. This text has been left 
undated by Schuh and Dagyab, although the text itself gives the year of writing as 
shing bya (wood bird). The date of this text is hard to establish as the context 
provides only a few clues as to the possible date ofthe writing of this text, so we are 
left with only two probable dates of 1765 or 1885. However, the issue of grain and 
gifts to the Brag dkar pa family mentioned in this document (Y AI) probably refers to 
the compensation given to the family by the Tibetan Government for not heeding the 
requests of the Sikkimese government after the Gorkha Tibetan war, to return the 
lands- annexed by the Gorkhas during the invasion of 1788. As it states in Y A8 that 
the grain levied as tax on the Bhutanese territories of Phag ri, would be granted to the 
Brag dkar pa family. So the date of this document should be similar to that of Y A8 so 
perhaps shing by~ should read Ichags bya i.e. J 80 I. 
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In this paper, one section focuses on, clarifying the confusion 
relating to the extent of Nepalese territorial gains after the invasion of 
Sikkim in 1788, for prior to the invasion of Sikkim these lands were 
under the control of the Brag dkar pa family and thus the reaction of the 
Sikkimese government to such a loss of territory will be an import~nt 
indication of the closeness of the alliance between the Chos rgyal and 
the Brag dkar pa family. 
Historical background 
Eighteenth century Sikkim was afflicted by internal discord and 
external pressures on its territorial integrity. The first Bhutanese 
invasion in the early years of the eighteenth century, which was 
instigated by the sister of the third Chos rgyal Phyag rdor rnam rgyal, 
was one of a series of international conflicts that continued until the 
end of the centurl. This action arose out of a dispute over the royal 
succession, and such disputes became a matter of course during the 
eighteenth century as competing factions vying for political dominance 
used and manipulated the royal succession for the advancement of their 
aims. This fragility of the young Sikkimese state was exacerbated by 
external pressures on both its western (Nepal) and eastern (Bhutan) 
boundaries. 
Furthermore, as a result of the weakness of the Sikkimese state in 
counteracting these external pressures, it became necessary for the 
government to both reinforce its internal alliances and strengthen 
relations with Tibet for times when Tibetan assistance was needed. 
Tibetan support during this period took a number of different forms, 
such as granting refuge to the chos rgyals, pressurizing the Bhutanese, 
sending officials to organize and manage the state and military 
apparatus and give military and financial support. The first example of 
this support is to be found during the period of the Bhutanese invasion. 
During the time of the first Bhutanese war, the Brag dkar pa family 
makes its initial appearance in the politics of Sikkim. As it states in 
) With the benefit of hindsight. we can see that the eighteenth century was a 
'make or break' period in the political evolution of Sikkimese statehood. The 
conflicts of the eighteenth century severely weakened not only the internal political 
establ ishments of the state but also the territorial integrity of Sikkim and had it not 
been for the desires of the British to open and exploit trading opportunities in Tibet 
and China. the fate of Sikkim could have been similar to that of the Himalayan states 
of eastern NepaL 
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'Bras ljongs rgyal rabs, and documents Y A4 and Y A8 of the Brag dkar 
pa collection, Ka rma dar rgyas brag dkar pa assisted the Sikkimese 
during the first Bhutanese war by acting as general of the Sikkimese 
forces from Rabs Idan rtse to Gangtok. In document Y A8 of the Brag 
dkar pa collection it states that the younger brother of a regional 
administrator of the Tibetan government was sent by the government of 
Tibet after a request made by the Sikkimese: 
4Since from this place (Sikkim) it was requested to the 
government capital of the great dGan Idan pho brang (the 
Tibetan g(wernment) asking for care (in this time of political 
unrest), it was given as an order of the spiritual leaders that the 
younger brother of Brag dkar mi dpon of dBus (is to act) as the 
companion of the law and by order of the spiritual leader (he) 
was dispatched.6 
It may be interesting to note that in my conversations with the 
current head of the Brag dkar pa family, Mr. D. N. Tarkapa, the person 
mentioned in this text was none other than Ka rma dar rgyas. The 
reason a person capable of leading Sikkim was requested from Tibet 
was due to the fact that the Chos rgyal phyag rdor mam rgyal had 
escaped to Tibet after various political intrigues at the Sikkimese court 
and the attempts of the Bhutanese, backed by the Ch os rgyal own sister, 
to assassinate him. Furthermore most of Sikkim at that time was under 
the control of the Bhutanese. 
In the absence of the King, Ka rma dar rgyas is said to have acted 
as regent of the state as well as general of the army, and in this role 
succeeded in killing the Bhutanese military leader7 (figure 1), pushed 
the forces of Bhutan back and maintained the independence of Sikkim.8 
As a result of these actions it is said in the 'Bras ljongs rgyal rabs that 
4 Tib. Gshungs sa dga' ldan pho brang chen por skyid sdug snyan zhu kyi Ijongs 
'di 'f 'tsho 'dzin khrims kyi zung zlar dbus brag dkar mi dpon gyi chung po bla Iha 'j 
lung bahs bla dpon bkas mngag. Y A8 line 7. 
5 Presumably the Dalai Lama or the regent of Tibet. 
6 Document Y A8. This younger brother was more than likely a low level district 
administrator of the central Tibetan government, with a loose connection to the 
political centre of Lhasa. This conclusion rests primarily on evidence of similar 
deputations from Lhasa to other outlying Himalayan dependencies such as in 
Mustang. (Personal conversation with Dr Charles Ramble). 
7 'Bras Ijongs rgyal rabs: 68-69 (Tibetan version). It also states that Ka rma dar 
r;yas severed the head of the general. 
S Ibid. 
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he was rewarded with an estate in Sikkim.9 However, this grant of an 
estate also reflects the need of the Chos rgyal and his allies to defuse 
potential political opponents. By giving Ka rma dar rgyas rulership 
over a large estate (in what is now West Sikkim) extending to 
Darjeeling, he had assured the loyalty of a person with immense 
political influence and the means to challenge the position of the Chos 
rgyal and his associates. As a result of this gift of an estate to the Brag 
dkar pa family, a member of a Sikkimese aristocratic family was sent to 
Tibet to serve the government of Lhasa. lo While this exchange of 
ranking officials served to strengthen the alliance between Tibet and 
Sikkim, it also legitimized the grant of land bestowed upon the Brag 
dkar pa family. Whereas Tibet did not really benefit from such an 
exchange, Sikkim managed to acquire a powerful individual, who, 
through his association with Tibet and the Tibetan government, was 
highly influential in Sikkimese politics. 
9 However, the text referred to in 'Bras Ijongs rgyal rabs (Tibetan version ibid.), 
seems, at least in part, to be taken verbatim from Y AB, which is a much later 
document. Those wishing to inspect this discrepancy further are directed to lines 10-
12 of Y AB and ibid. 
10 Conversation with D. N. Tarkapa. D. N Tarkapa also informed me that he is 
obliged by tradition (and presumably earlier law) to carry out the Bon rituals of the 
Sikkimese minister who was sent to Tibet in exchange for his ancestor Ka rma dar 
rgyas and up until the Chinese invasion of Tibet in the 1950s the local rituals of his 
ancestors in Tibet we,.:: carried out by the Sikkimese official. Every year D. N. 
Tarkapa performs the ritual sacrifice of livestock. It is interesting to note that this 
'exchange' of officials is remarkably similar to the form of taxation which applied to 
the noble families of Tibet as Carrasco states: 'In return for the landed estates with 
which they are endowed, each noble family has to give one ... oftheir members to the 
service of the government. This is considered their tax ... ' Land and polity in Tibel: 
1959: 131. Since this tax was levied against trle Sikkimese government this may 
indicate a period ofvassaJage to the Tibetan state. 
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Figure 1. The helmet and sword of the Bhutanese general killed by Ka 
rma dar rgyas. The sword and helmet were taken as a trophy to g. Yang 
thang where they are still preserved by D.N. Tarkapa. 
The documents 
The time period in which these documents fall (; 785-1796) was 
particularly turbulent, not only for Sikkim but also for Tibet and 
Bhutan. Political developments resulting from the expansion of Nepal. 
undermined and threatened the regional status quo. The Nepalese 
invasion of Tibet in 1792 forced the Tibetans to seek military aid from 
China, which had the effect of changing the political relationship 
between those two countries. Furthermore, as a result of these 
significant developments in central Tibet, Tibet became more 
concerned about its internal politics which in turn had ramifications on 
the nature of Tibetan and Sikkimese relations. Sikkim had also been 
under considerable threat since the 1770s from both Nepal, which had 
taken possession of territory which the Sikkimese considered to be 
theirs in 1774, and Bhutan.!! Thus areas of Sikkimese political 
influence, if not actual control, were being squeezed and annexed by 
11 Pradhan: 1991: 123. Pradhan clearly states that the objective of this annexation 
of territory, loosely affiliated with Sikkim, was to gain possession of the fertile Terai 
to the west of the River Tista. This territory was basically the Limbuana region, 
which, despite Sikkimese claims, had remained autonomous of the Sikkimese state. 
BULLETIN OF TIBETOLOGY 59 
the expansion of both Nepal and 3hutan. The first document to be 
discussed was written within this wider political context and before the 
actual Nepalese invasion of Sikkim in 1788 whereas the second 
document was written after the chaos of the Nepalese invasion of 
Sikkim and the Nepalese-Tibetan war of 1790-1792. 
Given this wider political context of external threat, document Y A4 
could best be considered as a reminder to the Brag dkar pa family of 
the loyalty of their ancestors. The document is mainly concerned with 
the verification of lands already bestowed upon the ancestors of the 
Brag dkar pa family and includes references to the history behind the 
acquisition of these regions rather than the issuing of new lands to the 
family. It is therefore possible to suggest that the issuing of this 
document to the Brag dkar pa family resulted from the wish of the 
Chos rgyal and his advisors to gauge the extent of support they could 
rely on in the event of a war and to remind key political figures of the 
possible benefits of remaining loyal to the Chos rgyal. For example, 
this particular document makes extended references to the lands that Ka 
rma dar rgyas received for his action during the Bhutanese invasion of 
the early years of the eighteenth century. In essence this document 
serves to highlight the alliance that existed between the Brag dkar pa 
family and the Sikkimese state and assures Tshangs rin 'dzin, the head 
of Brag dkar pa family at this time, of his position. 
The reason for doing this is quite clear. The threat posed by the 
Nepalese was severe as, according to Pradhan, the Gorkhas desired to 
control trans-Himalayan trade and had secured a treaty from Tibet to 
that effect in 1775. Iiowever, by 1784 the Tibetans opened a trade route 
with Sikkim through the Chumbi valley in order to get around the high 
taxes levied against Tibetan traders through the Nepalese routes. 12 This 
heightened the possibility of a war between Sikkim and Nepal as Nepal 
had quite clear designs to run a monopoly of Himalayan trade. 
Furthermore, taking Sikkim out of the equation would stop attacks 
from Sikkim on Nepal's eastern border should the Gorkhas choose to 
invade Tibet in order to force the issue of Himalayan trade. The 
Sikkimese government was probably aware of Nepal's aspirations 
regarding trade, as they had suffered a number of losses prior to the 
treaty of 1775 to Nepal in its western regions bordering on Tibet; and it 
is by no coincidence that in the same year as the opening of the 
Sikkimese - Tibetan trade route, the Chos rgyal issued documents 
12 Pradhan: ) 991: 130 - 31. 
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relating to lands already held as a means of reinforcing traditional 
internal alliances. 
In 1788, Nepal invaded Sikkim and it is said in the 'Bras Ijongs 
rgyai rabs that the Sikkimese government was taken by surprise by the 
Gorkha invasion. 13 However, Nepal had been encroaching on 
Sikkimese territory, despite the peace treaty of 1775, and perhaps the 
surprise documented in 'Bras ijongs rgyal rabs refers rather to the 
speed of the Nepalese invasion and the total defeat of Sikkim by the 
two-pronged offensive from Bijaypur and the Darjeeling district. 14 As a 
result of this invasion the Chos rgyal fled towards the Bhutanese border 
and was given financial aid from the Bhutanese. What happened to this 
aid is uncertain. However, according to Y A8, Tshangs rin 'dzin carried 
on the fight against the Gorkhas and managed to make a number of 
successful punitive attacks on the Nepalese. Y A8 lines 12 13 reads 
thus: l5 
When in the times of the sde pa Tshangs rin 'dzin in the sa 
sprel year [1788] Gorkha troops attacked and in the times when 
the troops of the Iho po and Lepcha departed against the 
enemies of the [Buddhist] teachings, the brother Brag dkar sde 
pa Tshangs rin 'dzin departed first as the military leader. [And] 
after[wards] he forced the Gorkha troops back over rNam rtse, 
Chong thang and Sing la ... 
However, after Tshangs rin 'dzin death in battle in 1788 the 
Sikkimese forces, at least according to 'Bras Ijongs ~~ai robs and 
Y AS. were severely weakened and eventually collapsed. 6 The events 
after this point become muddled in the chaotic aftermath of the Tibetan 
Gorkha war of the 1790s. As noted above, the invasion of Sikkim 
was a tactical manoeuvre on the part of the Gorkhas to defuse a 
possible attack from Sikkim after the invasion of Tibet. However, what 
is uncertain is the extent of Gorkha control over Sikkimcse territory 
after the 1792 war between Tibet, China and Nepal. 
Most of the secondary literature seems divided on the actual 
geographical distinctions between Nepalese controlled Sikkim and the 
areas under the authority of the Sikkimese chos rgyals. F.I.S. Tucker, 
for example, states that the six thousand troops that were dispatched to 
13 Ye shes sgrol ma: 1908: 48 (Eng. Version). 
14 {bid. and Pradhan: 1991: 132. 
15 Y A8. Square brackets are the authors. 
16 Ye shes sgrol ma: 1908: 48 and YA8. 
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Sikkim in J 788 overran most of the Sikkimese territory in the Terai and 
the hills but were unable to penetrate the territory surrounding modern 
Gangtok. 17 BJ. Hasrat, however, seems confused in regard to the limits 
of Nepalese conquest as he states that the Gorkhas possessed most of 
Sikkim but the area of Nag po ri l8 (presumably this refers to Nag ri -
which equates roughly with the modern Indian administrative district of 
Darjeeling)19 was held jointly by Sikkim and Nepal. This seems to be 
mistaken as this particular region remained under direct Nepalese 
control until the end of the Anglo-Gorkha war and the signing of the 
treaty of Sugauli in 1815. L.F. Stiller on the other hand shows the 
eastern border of Nepal as following the Raman River until its 
confluence with the Tista (the territory to the east of the Tista was 
under the administration of Bhutan).2o The map in Bajracharya's book 
entitled Bahadur Shah: the Regent of Nepal, shows that Nepal had 
possession of all of Sikkim's territory in the Terai south of the Raman 
River, west of the Tista and east of the Mechi River.21 
While it has been established that the Nepalese had control of the 
Sikkimese capital of Rabdentse in 1788, what is not known is for how 
long they occupied this territory to the west of the Tista and in the hi lis. 
The 'Bras ljongs rgyal rabs sheds no light on this issue, being mainly 
concerned with lamenting the injustice of the Nepalese invasion. 
Having said that, there is one clue to be found in document Y A8 and 
that is the place where the document was written and some of the 
contents. The final sentence of th is document reads thus: 'lugs gnyis kyi 
gdan sa chen po pho brang rab brtan rtse nas me 'brug dbo zla 'i yar 
tshes dge bar bris' (This was virtuously written in the time of the 
middle of the second month of the fire dragon year from the great place 
of the dual system [of religion and politics] the palace of Rabdentse). 
While it could be the case that this reference to Rabdentse is nothing 
more than a wish of the government to maintain continuity with 
territory lost during the Nepalese invasion, it appears not to be so. A 
more detailed examination of the Tibetan documents, especially 
document Y A8 clarifies the extent of Nepalese control in the western 
Sikkimese hills. 'So it happened that the region beyond [to the south 
of] Sing la [an area close to the modern boundary of West Sikkim and 
17 F. Tucker: 1957: 57. 
18 B. J. Hasrat: 1971: 268. 
19 Regmi: 1975: 55. 
20 L. F. Sti Her: 1973: Inserted map back cover. 
21 Bajracharya: 1992: 1. 
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West Bengal] slipped into the hands of others,22 [i.e. the Nepalese]. 
The territory referred to here includes the district of modern Darjeeling 
and the land of the Sikkimese Terai extending eastwards to the Tista 
and south beyond Siliguri. 
The document continues in an apologetic way, for this land had 
been a part of the endowments the ancestors of the Brag dkar pa family 
had been given by the Sikkimese state in the time of Ka rma dar rgyas. 
It further states that the government had sent a petition to the Tibetan 
government and the Ambans in Lhasa relating to this lost territory and 
that the Tibetan government had responded by granting the family the 
tax revenues of Phag ri rdzong in the Chumbi valley. The granting of 
these gifts is also alluded to in document Y A I of the Brag dkar pa 
collection, which is a document from the financial/revenue office of the 
Kashag and carries the black seal associated with that office. 23 
From lines 22-24 of Y A8 the areas of land which remained in the 
ownership of the Brag dkar pa family are listed and included in this list 
is the area of g.Yang sgang which relates to the modern estate of 
g.Yang thang rdzong,24 the residential lands of the Brag dkar pa family 
in West Sikkim. This seems to suggest that the region permanently 
acquired by the Nepalese after the invasion of Sikkim was the Terai up 
to where the Raman meets the Tista and then following the Tista 
southwards to the plains. What is still ambiguous, however, is the 
duration that the areas of West Sikkim, including the palace of Rab 
brtan rtse, were held by the Nepalese after the invasion in 1788. 
While this document perhaps provides some interesting information 
on the extent of Nepalese held territory, it also gives some interesting 
22 Document Y AS. 
23 YA1 is reproduced here in full: rtsis khang nas I mchod yon gong ma'i bka' 
shogs dgongs 'breI 'di ga nas 'go mchan song don bzhin I 'bras Ijongs blon brag sha 
nas sa mchams dang dmag don gyi zhabs ('degs) zhus t:jes gsol ras 'di 10 'i 'bab 'bru 
ru'i khal nyi shu tham pa phag ri Ijong sdod sbrel po 'i lho 'i pa 'i sho nas sprad pas 
rtsis 'gro sngar lam bzhin yong ba gyis, shing [1chags] bya zla ches la I 
24 g.Yang sgang at first inspection seems to indicate a precious mountain ridge or 
spur. Whereas in the meaning of the place name: g.Yang thang, the mountain spur 
(sgang) becomes plain (thang) thus forming the combined connotation: precious 
plain. g.yang in this instance refers to g.yang as in g.yang sgam (g.yang grom in the 
Sikkimese dialect) i.e a treasure box of religious articles. It is also possible that the 
use of g.yang in this place name implies a gorge I ravine and in the Sikkimese dialect 
g.yang can mean a kind of grass used for thatching [which happens to grow locally], 
which could provide two likely translations: 'the plain of the gorge' or 'the plain of 
g.yang'. Whatever, the precise origins of this place name it seems from the text in 
question that the residential estate of the Brag dkar pa family had previously been 
called g. Yang sgang. 
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details about the nature of the internal alliance between the Chos rgyal 
and the Brag dkar pa minister. Contained within the later sections of 
VAS, are a number of references to the loyalty of the fami Iy throughout 
history, the association of the Brag dkar pa family with the family of 
the Chos rgyal and commands to those under the administration of 
Sikkim, whether of high or low status, to obey and respect the old Brag 
dkar pa minister. While it may be argued that this is only a literary 
convention and thus have no significant meaning, it seems that this is 
not the case here. Not only had a member of the Brag dkar pa family 
given his lifc in the protection of the country but he also aided the Chos 
rgyal in his escape to the Bhutanese border, which probably saved the 
life of the Chos rgyal. The government thus seems to be genuinely 
grateful for such acts and apologetic at the loss of territory under the 
control of the Brag dkar pa family. 
Moreover, this document serves to re-establish the alliance between 
the government and rdzong dpon after what had becn a 'make or break' 
period in Sikkimese politics. It also signals a return to the status quo, an 
offering of thanks to this family for their efforts and loyalty and 
recognition of Tshangs rig 'dzin death during the conflict. 
Conclusion 
The eighteenth century was undoubtedly a turbulent time in Sikkimese 
history: not only was Sikkim facing external threats, but also internal 
ones resulting from its relative youth as a state. Given this political 
context, it became increasingly important for the government to 
establish and maintain both internal alliances with powerful individuals 
and possible opponents, as well as external links with the Tibetan 
authorities. The documents relating to the Brag dkar pa family referred 
to here provide us \vith one example of such political relationships. In 
addition, they also highlight the complex issues involved in the 
formation and maintenance of alliances such as that with the Brag dkar 
pa family in Sikkim. Ka rma dar rgyas, as an official of the Tibetan 
government (although of a low level) sent to take control of the military 
and administrative apparatus of Sikkim, could have become a threat to 
the Sikkimese government. However, by bestowing an estate on his 
family and legitimizing this gift by sending a Sikkimese official to 
Tibet in return, the Sikkimese not only managed to neutralize a 
potential political opponent but also managed to establish an alliance 
with a powerful individual. Furthermore, after the time of Ka rma dar 
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rgyas and the continued residence of his family in Sikkim, this earlier 
grant of land also serves as an emotional bond, based on the 
recognition that the position of the Brag dkar pa family in Sikkim 
resulted from this political alliance with the Chos rgyal. 
It is perhaps this emotional bond that document Y A4 alludes to by 
the simple re-stating of the history of the family's acquisition of land. 
Also, the granting of land, which after all is the means for economic 
sustainability, gives such an alliance a physical quality. Clearly status is 
not only achieved through family histories but also through bonds of 
political and economic association between the state and the individual. 
Thus the political position and the general status of the Brag dkar pa 
family became inter-connected with the fortunes or misfortunes of the 
Sikkimese state. It is perhaps these economic, social, political and 
emotional bonds that Y A4 is intending to exploit in order to guarantee 
the participation and support for the state in times of political 
instability. 
So in conclusion, these documents help to give us an idea of the 
way in which, alliances are constructed and maintained, as well as 
providing clues to the way in which the internal political mechanisms 
of the Sikkimese state operated. The example of the relationships 
between the Brag dkar pa fami Iy and the state, may be used to assist 
our understanding of internal alliances in Sikkim in the wider context. 
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